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On today’s educational stage, Finland and Singapore cast outsized shadows. Since 
gaining the spotlight with standout performances in PISA and TIMSS, these rel-
atively small countries – each weighing in at roughly 5.5 million people (United 
Nations, 2017) – have featured in policy discussions and media reports worldwide. 
It has become commonplace to see headlines such as ‘Scotland eyes Singapore in 
“radical” overhaul of teaching career paths’ (Hepburn, 2017) or ‘Highly trained, 
respected and free: why Finland’s teachers are different’ (Crouch, 2015).
Yet, as these headlines suggest, Finland’s and Singapore’s respective teaching 
professions are lauded for different traits. While international commentary often 
highlights Singapore’s teaching career progression that creates incentives for 
teachers to incrementally develop their practice (e.g. Nelson, 2016), discussions 
about Finland frequently focus on the professional autonomy that its teachers 
enjoy (e.g. Crouch, 2015). These differences derive from disparate approaches 
to teacher accountability. Singapore has an extensive teacher performance man-
agement system incorporating detailed performance standards, regular formal 
appraisals, a career ladder and competition-based salary bonuses (Kan, 2014; 
Sclafani and Lim, 2008). In contrast, the teaching profession in Finland has 
minimal rewards and penalties, with neither formal evaluation nor promotion 
(Finnish National Board of Education, 2013; Sahlberg, 2015).
Strikingly, these disparate approaches to teacher accountability both appear 
to be effective. Notwithstanding Singapore’s recent dominance of TIMSS and 
PISA league tables and Finland’s recent declines in the same (Martin et al., 
2016a,b; OECD, 2016), both the education systems continue to receive interna-
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I propose that the answer lies in how teacher accountability instruments affect 
teacher motivation, and how this accountability-motivation link is shaped by 
sociocultural patterns in the macrosystem. To preview the argument, one cru-
cial macrosystemic pattern is that both the countries enjoy high public trust in 
the education system – but this trust is distributed differently across the two sys-
tems. In  Finland,  public trust permeates every level of the education system. 
Accordingly, at the classroom level, teachers are trusted to work autonomously, 
with little formal monitoring. However, in Singapore, public trust is focused upon 
the Ministry of Education and its capacity to deliver good learning outcomes 
system-wide – hence the extensive, centrally steered system for managing the 
teachers’ performance. Despite these differences, both the systems experience a 
similar feedback loop between trust, accountability and teacher motivation: the 
distribution of trust legitimates the choice of teacher accountability instruments, 
BOX 1: INTERVIEW METHODS
In this chapter, I draw on interviews with 12 teachers from 11 different second-
ary schools in Singapore (for pupils from ages 13 to 16/17), and 12 teachers 
from 10 lower secondary schools in Finland (for ages 13–15). The interviews 
were conducted during July 2018 and September 2018, respectively. These 
interviews are part of a larger mixed-methods research project on teacher 
accountability policy and sociocultural context across countries, which also 
include statistical analysis of sociocultural surveys and international large-
scale assessments. Accordingly, I interviewed teachers in the level of school-
ing that corresponded with PISA and TIMSS (Grade 8) participation.
The sample of participants was not chosen systematically, since I relied 
on personal and professional networks for participant recruitment. However, 
I ensured that participants varied in the subjects they taught, their teach-
ing experience, administrative roles and school types, and also in personal 
characteristics such as gender, ethnolinguistic background and whether they 
grew up in the country or abroad. Each teacher participated in one individual 
interview, which was audio recorded and subsequently transcribed. I then 
coded the transcripts using a coding scheme that was based on the the-
oretical framework and research questions, with revisions and additions to 
accommodate themes arising in the corpus. Portions of the coded data were 
summarised into matrices, to give a visual overview of the corpus without the 
misleading appearance of precision that would accompany percentages or 
other numerical summaries. Finally, I reread each transcript in full to ensure 
that the matrices and illustrative quotes accurately represented each inter-
view. Participants are identified by pseudonyms, and interview quotes have 
been edited for readability. For further details about interview methods, see 
Hwa (2019).
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which means that teachers respond to the instruments positively, which, in turn, 
contributes to desirable student outcomes that reinforce the distribution of trust.
Teacher accountability in Finland and Singapore
If we think of teacher accountability instruments as structures or practices that 
(1) set standards, (2) convey information and (3) allocate rewards and penalties 
for teacher practice,1 Finland and Singapore differ in all the three categories. 
In Singapore, all teachers are subject to the education ministry’s Enhanced 
Performance Management System (EPMS), which codifies extensive stand-
ards for teacher practice, collects detailed information on teachers’ work and 
administers a complicated system of rewards and penalties for teacher perfor-
mance. In the words of Mark, an interview participant from Singapore:
I really do think that the EPMS works well for the identification of teach-
ers who are in need of support, and the identification of teachers who are 
in need of greater opportunity in order to stretch them for greater impact. 
I also think that, on a simple day-to-day level, […] it helps to guide the 
work of every general education officer and senior education officer in the 
system. […] Now, from an incentives perspective, it certainly incentivises 
hard work, if it’s done fairly.
In contrast, Finland sets high standards at the point of entry into the teaching 
profession, through highly selective admissions to teacher training and exten-
sive socialisation during this training. But once teachers are in classrooms, 
their school leaders, municipal officials and central government authorities 
generally assume that they are doing their jobs well, unless complaints from 
students or parents indicate otherwise. According to Finnish interview par-
ticipant Helena,
You don’t need as many control tools when the assumption is that we 
teachers are professionals who know their job and have the skills, and that 
we are all interested in the same goals and in delivering the curriculum.
In the rest of this section, I explore these contrasts between Finland’s and 
Singapore’s teacher accountability approaches in more detail.
Setting standards for teacher practice
Finland’s teacher accountability system operates primarily by setting high stand-
ards for teacher practice. Almost every interview participant named the national 
curriculum as an accountability instrument. Even if some teachers may not always 
comply with curricular minutiae, they still value its standard-setting role. For 
example, while calling the current curriculum ‘very complicated to understand’ 
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and ‘sometimes unclear’, and saying that there were probably some curricular 
expectations that she was not fulfilling, Finnish participant Liisa also said:
Well, we need to have a national curriculum. It’s definitely a ‘must’. If we 
didn’t have it, then we would not have a common ground for the students 
to continue on to upper secondary school.
In addition to agreeing that the curriculum was important, participants also 
agreed that it left them substantial freedom in their practice. In Anneli’s words, 
‘The national curriculum gives us guidelines, but I can still do my work the way 
that I feel is the best way for me, and for my students.’
However, a strong national curriculum is hardly a unique feature among 
education systems worldwide. Arguably more important than the curriculum 
are the standards set by Finland’s famously stringent admissions processes for 
teacher training (Malinen et al., 2012; Muhonen, 2017), as well as its rig-
orous, master’s-level teacher training programmes (Sahlberg, 2015; Tirri, 
2014). Admissions standards and pre-service training may not fit some con-
ceptions of  teacher accountability instruments, but they undoubtedly play a 
role in Finnish teacher accountability. Admissions standards ensure that those 
who are chosen to enter the profession are highly motivated to teach well, 
while pre-service training ingrains the expertise that orients their motivation 
towards effective practices. Although a few interview participants mentioned 
neither the admissions criteria nor the pre-service training, this is probably 
because such point-of-entry instruments may be taken for granted in teachers’ 
day-to-day work.2 However, Antero called the stringent admissions processes 
‘the most important thing’ that the government can do for teaching quality. 
Likewise, Masa said that pre-service teacher training was ‘the most influential 
thing’ in teacher-related policy, far more important ‘incentives and disincen-
tives and that kind of stuff’.
Singapore’s teacher training programme is similarly selective, with one 
account stating that it admits roughly 12.5% of applicants (Butrymowicz, 
2014), comparable to Finland’s 11% admission rate for class teacher education 
programmes in 2016 (Paronen and Lappi, 2018). However, Singaporean inter-
view participants did not identify teacher training as an instrument for teacher 
accountability. The closest they came was Timothy mentioning that he had to 
apply twice before successfully getting a teacher training scholarship, and Andy 
saying that one of his lecturers had told their class of trainees that ‘sometimes 
you do need to know when to blow your own trumpet’ in order to get a good 
performance ranking.
Such ranking takes places through the EPMS. The EPMS is the education 
ministry’s version of the national civil service appraisal system, which was itself 
based on the performance management system used by the Shell Petroleum 
Company in the 1980s (Ho and Koh, 2018; Liew, 2012; Neo and Chen, 2007; 
Quah, 2010). Central to the EMPS is its teaching career ladder, which has three 
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tracks: teaching, leadership and senior specialist (Crehan, 2016b). The system sets 
performance standards in several key results areas under three outcome catego-
ries, which vary according to the teacher’s position on the career ladder as well as 
their career track (Kan, 2014). To illustrate, Joseph said that:
Under the teaching track, there are three areas that they will look at. The 
first, nurturing the child, will encompass your subject and your form 
teacher responsibilities, as well as aspects of your CCA [i.e. cocurricular 
activity]. Then you have professional development—so, what are the train-
ing plans that you have? Another one is organisational contribution—so, 
what are the portfolios and school programmes that you actually contrib-
ute to?
This comprehensive, tiered system of standards contrasts with the approach 
described by Finnish interview participants, who emphasised the pedagogical 
freedom afforded by the curriculum. Besides EMPS structures, many inter-
view participants also mentioned accountability instruments within their subject 
departments. Department-level instruments include standards for syllabus cover-
age and assessment frequency – and also for student achievement in the national 
standardised exams that loom large over the school system.
Collecting and conveying information on teacher practice
While test scores are pivotal to many teacher accountability systems, pupils in 
Finland do not take any national standardised tests until they reach the matric-
ulation exam for university entry. Instead, in many schools, one source of infor-
mation on teacher practice is an annual developmental discussion between each 
teacher and their principal (Kumpulainen and Lankinen, 2016). While every 
interview participant mentioned such discussions, some said that the discussions 
did not take place every year, or that they took place in groups of subject teachers 
rather than as targeted individual reviews.3 Most said that the discussions were 
informal in tone, involved two-way feedback and did not lead to any follow-up. 
In Maarit’s account:
I think that the sitting down and talking are sometimes forgotten after that. 
I’ll write down something fine, and then we talk, and then the year, every 
day continues, and probably now I don’t even remember what I answered.
Apart from the developmental discussions, sources of information about teacher 
practice that were identified by interview participants include self-initiated col-
laborations between colleagues (e.g. to develop content for a particular unit, or 
to remedy a classroom problem), and discussions or lesson observations trig-
gered by parental complaints. Such parent-triggered interventions appear to 
Contrasting approaches, comparable efficacy? 7
be rare, with participants mentioning only a few specific incidents over their 
careers. (That said, a few participants did mention that parents have become 
more demanding in recent years, especially in more socioeconomically privi-
leged areas.)
Besides these relatively sparse instruments that collect and communicate 
information in order to directly influence teacher practice, there are some 
monitoring instruments that collect information on teacher practice in order 
to facilitate administrative decisions. The Finnish Education Evaluation Centre 
administers a system of sample-based tests to monitor national educational qual-
ity (Vainikainen et al., 2017). However, these sample-based tests do not play an 
accountability function in individual teachers’ work. In Kristiina’s words, ‘I have 
never known anybody, or any school, or any teacher who has taken part of 
them. So they are not related to the everyday work of a teacher.’ Similarly, Satu 
mentioned that her municipality collects feedback about some aspects of teacher 
practice and job satisfaction but added that:
It’s not a very important thing for me when I’m working from Monday to 
Friday. I don’t think it about it very much. […] It’s just a way to transfer 
the results to higher levels, but it doesn’t come down to me again. […] The 
municipality gives the money and the guidelines about what work you 
have to do. So they have to follow up about whether everything is okay, 
and if there are things to do better, in the future. It’s important. But most 
of the teachers continue teaching the same way, and it doesn’t affect them 
so much.
Each of Finland’s municipalities – of which, in 2018, there were 311 (Statistics 
Finland, 2018) – has considerable decision-making power over local education 
(European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018b; Simola et al., 2009). As a 
result, some municipalities frequently collect information from teachers (Emilia: 
‘a massive amount of different questionnaires’), whereas others do not (Hannele: 
‘not at all’).
On the other hand, under Singapore’s centralised EPMS structures, all teach-
ers regularly report on their work through formal channels that inform annual 
performance grades. These performance grades are awarded on the basis of sev-
eral sources of information. At the beginning, middle and end of each school 
year, every teacher is required to document their targets and achievements on 
an EPMS form, and then to discuss their performance in a work review session 
with their reporting officer, i.e. a teacher with management-level responsibili-
ties. Teachers are also observed in the classroom once a year by their respective 
reporting officers, who also examine a sample of students’ work. These sources 
of information are then discussed at appraisal panels, where reporting officers tri-
angulate each other’s observations and compare teachers across each level of the 
career ladder, before allocating performance grades for the year. This can lead to 
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the sense that teachers are constantly under observation by all reporting officers 
in the school. As Sonia said:
Every time someone walks by, you know you are being judged. Say you 
turn up five minutes late to the parade ground for assembly, you know that 
someone out there is eyeballing you and marking you down and saying, 
‘Okay, this is the person with the so-called punctuality problem.’
Besides heightening self-consciousness and stress among some teachers, the 
informational requirements of the EPMS generate substantial administrative 
work for reporting officers, who may have to appraise numerous colleagues 
(Eleanor: ‘sometimes you have got a good ten staff to oversee, plus all the other 
admin work’).
Although EPMS criteria do not officially include student test results, almost 
all participants mentioned accountability pressures from tests and exams, 
whether national exam results at the end of secondary school or school-level 
tests and exams throughout the year. Another frequently cited teacher account-
ability instrument was parental feedback. Participants gave varying accounts 
of the frequency and intensity of parental feedback, but it was clear that this 
feedback could sometimes be onerous. For instance, Mark said that ‘parents 
expect the teachers to be on call 24/7 for student needs’, and Maggie noted 
that some teachers use phone number masking services in order to forestall 
such 24/7 contact.
Interestingly, Finnish and Singaporean participants had similarly mixed views 
on the extent to which professional collaborations with other teachers func-
tioned as an accountability instrument. Among Finnish participants, some spoke 
of regular collaborations, especially with colleagues who teach the same subjects. 
However, others said that collaboration was infrequent or only happened in spe-
cific situations, such as adapting new curricular requirements to their school’s 
needs. A few noted that levels of collaboration vary from school to school. Partly 
because of these differing levels of collaboration, participants also mentioned 
different degrees of accountability from colleagues, ranging from clear accounta-
bility relationships (e.g. Emilia: ‘At least in this school, because we collaborate so 
much, it’s more difficult to do things your own way, or to cut corners, or things 
like that’) to tenuous ones (e.g. Satu: ‘Nobody knows what I do in my classroom, 
[…] only myself and the students, but not my colleagues or the headmaster, 
nobody’). Likewise, some Singaporean participants did not mention peer collab-
oration at all, whereas some said that they collaborated regularly with colleagues, 
whether through formal departmental structures and professional learning com-
munities or via informal information-sharing and self-initiated partnerships. 
One participant, Maggie, said that most Singaporean teachers ‘hoard their mate-
rials and information quite a lot’ – but also described an intensive, yearlong 
collaboration with a colleague as her proudest achievement in teaching. These 
similarly mixed pictures of professional collaboration among teachers contradict 
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both the image of Finland as a haven of teacher professional collaboration (e.g. 
Strauss and Sahlberg, 2015), as well as the image of Singaporeans as relentlessly 
competitive, selfish people (e.g. Pierson, 2019).
Allocating rewards and penalties
Finland’s teacher accountability instruments for allocating rewards and penalties 
are similar to its instruments for collecting information on teacher practice: they 
are usually unobtrusive, and they vary across municipalities. Rewards come 
in the form of small salary supplements for teachers who take on extra tasks 
that are otherwise uncompensated – rather than bonuses based on how well 
a teacher has performed their tasks. Some of these supplements are part of the 
union-negotiated salary structure, while others come from the municipality’s 
discretionary budget. Supplements from the discretionary budget are allocated 
in different ways (e.g. Antero: based on the principal’s decision; Liisa: based on 
an application to the municipality) and for different tasks, whether routine (e.g. 
Kristiina: ‘if you take care of the annual choir performances at the school’) or ad 
hoc (e.g. Emilia: ‘a project which has touched the whole school’; Juhani: ‘when 
there’s been renovations in some schools, and you had to figure out new ways of 
teaching and change places a lot’).
Although there may be some element of merit in awarding the supplements 
for ad hoc tasks or in how the routine tasks are allocated, most participants did 
not regard these supplements as merit-based. (In Masa’s words: ‘I see that as, “If 
you want to do this crap job, then we’ll give you money for it.” And some crazy 
person is going to be okay with that, whereas the rest are like, “Phew, thank 
goodness I don’t have to do it.”’) Different municipalities distribute these salary 
supplements differently, and they can be so inconspicuous that two interview par-
ticipants from the same school disagreed about whether or not these supplements 
existed. Where they do exist, participants regarded them as token sums (e.g. 
Liisa: ‘around a hundred euros a month’; Emilia: ‘a gift card somewhere for fifty 
euros or something’; Satu: ‘the [salary] difference is very low, maybe you can buy 
one movie ticket’). As for penalties, besides the developmental actions that can 
be triggered by parental complaints, the only penalty that participants identified 
was the possibility of being fired for egregious misconduct, such as drunkenness 
or physical violence in school.
In contrast, every teacher in Singapore is eligible for an annual performance 
bonus – or subject to career progression penalties – based on their perfor-
mance grade. According to Mark, top-performing teachers in Singapore can 
receive annual bonuses of up to 3.5 months’ salary. Performance grades also affect 
the speed at which teachers are promoted through the career ladder. Additionally, 
good performance grades render teachers eligible for funded study leave (as noted 
by Maggie), whereas unsatisfactory grades lead to developmental coaching and 
extra monitoring (as noted by Jane and Joseph) and, eventually, firing (as noted 
by Maggie and Mark; see also Singapore Teachers’ Union, 2014, 2015).
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A noteworthy feature of the EPMS is that performance grades do not derive 
solely from EPMS standards. Rather, as Geok Ling observed, ‘It’s criterion- 
referenced, and then it’s also norm-referenced’. Within each school, performance 
grades are awarded on a forced curve that benchmarks teachers against colleagues 
of the same level of the career ladder. Official guidelines about the EPMS grad-
ing system are not publicly available, but one non-Ministry source says that 
approximately 30% of teachers receive A or B grades, 65% receive C grades and 
5% receive D or E grades (McMillan, 2017). Most participants mentioned that 
the competitive grading system can generate stress and demotivation for some 
teachers, and that a small minority of teachers attempted to game the system 
(e.g. by shifting time away from classroom preparation towards more visible 
committee work). However, despite its inbuilt competitiveness, and despite par-
ticipants’ acknowledgement that the fairness of the grading system could vary 
vastly across schools and reporting officers, the EPMS did not appear to under-
mine collegiality among teachers. In Andy’s words, ‘We do recognise those 
who are deserving of credit because […] something about them enables them to 
go above and beyond for the students, and we don’t begrudge them if they are 
rewarded accordingly’.
Compatibility among teacher accountability instruments
In Finland, selection processes for admission into teacher training ensure that 
those who enter the profession are intrinsically motivated to do their jobs well, 
and carefully designed pre-service teacher training programmes ensure that 
teachers know what such effectiveness looks like. This lessens the need for stand-
ards, informational channels and reward systems for controlling the in-service 
processes and outputs of teachers’ work. In this setting, such external con-
trols are not only unnecessary, but also undesirable. As Deci and Ryan (2000) 
famously argue, extrinsic rewards and other forms of control can impinge on 
the sense of autonomy that is crucial to sustaining intrinsic motivation (see also 
Chapter 2 of this volume). Furthermore, several participants emphasised the 
need for teachers to have the freedom to use their skills and personalities to 
facilitate student learning as they see fit. Such autonomy would be incompatible 
with exhaustive standard-setting and information-gathering instruments.
Autonomy notwithstanding, the input standards are strong enough to lessen 
the risk that teachers will deviate from the overarching goals of the education 
system. The government’s teacher accountability instruments may be con-
centrated at the point of entry into the profession, but these standards are 
sustained – and perhaps reinforced – over time. According to Päivi, an experi-
enced teacher who had once been in school leadership before opting to return 
to the classroom:
When I was the headmaster, I had the idea that when young teachers 
come to the school, then we could learn so many new things from them. 
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[…] But then I saw that, after a year or two, new teachers are just the 
same as old teachers. […] But I wouldn’t change it. Teachers are kind and 
they are caring and they are hoping for the children’s best. And that’s the 
way it is.
Thus, the rigorous input standards offset the risks generated by the sparse-
ness of formal teacher accountability instruments for processes and outputs. The 
capacity of these standards for reducing deviation is also evident in the fact that 
Finland has consistently had the smallest between-school variance in PISA scores 
among OECD countries (with the exception of PISA 2003, when Iceland had 
a marginally lower variance, and PISA 2000, when Sweden and Iceland had 
lower variances; OECD, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016; OECD and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, 2003).
In Singapore, the teacher accountability system hinges on extensive informa-
tion and powerful extrinsic incentives. This means that it would be vulnerable to 
failure if either the information or the consequences proved inadequate. But this 
vulnerability is mitigated by the magnitude of the performance bonuses, which 
can influence teacher motivation considerably. (In Adeline’s words: ‘Singaporean 
teachers are very typical civil servants, and they like to have their various KPIs and 
know that if they meet them, they might get rewarded’.) Furthermore, EPMS job 
descriptions for management-level positions in the career ladder ensure that enough 
time is channelled towards collecting information on teacher practice. Peter, who 
had recently become a subject head, said the following about his promotion:
It has changed my outlook of who I am as a teacher. […] Because I know 
that my performance is going to be evaluated in the lens of being a subject 
head, I guess that shifts my focus a little when it comes to how much I’m 
involved in things that aren’t subject-related.
Thus, there is compatibility between the standard-setting, informational, 
and consequential elements of the EPMS. The standards designate resources for 
information collection (among other things), while information enables the allo-
cation of consequences, which, in turn, shore up the influence of the standards.
Collectively, these EPMS instruments exert extensive government control 
over teachers’ work. However, this impingement on teacher autonomy is some-
what mitigated because government expectations of teachers often converge with 
what teachers expect of themselves. In particular, several teachers mentioned that 
they appreciated the ministry’s emphasis on both academic and socioemotional 
development. When asked whether ministry expectations overlapped with her 
own, Sonia said:
I think they do converge quite a bit. […] Why I got into [teaching] was 
because I want to help mould the character of students, and it does give 
me a lot of satisfaction when I see my students perform well academically.
12 Yue-Yi Hwa
Hence, good policy design softens teachers’ experiences of extensive account-
ability instruments. While criticising some aspects of the EPMS, Timothy also 
said he was ‘intrigued and amazed’ at the comprehensiveness of its rubrics. 
Similarly, Maggie said that the ministry’s pedagogical recommendations ‘are not 
really giving you trouble; they actually make your life simpler’. Again, inter-
national assessment results offer further support: in 2015, Singapore topped the 
tables across all PISA and TIMSS subjects and levels (Martin et al., 2016a,b,; 
OECD, 2016).
Summary
As shown in Table 11.1, Singapore’s teacher accountability system is far more exten-
sive than Finland’s in almost every respect. The sole exception is standard-setting 
at the point of entry to the teaching profession, which plays a bigger role in 
Finland than in Singapore. Besides these entry standards and the national cur-
riculum, Finland’s instruments for communicating information and allocating 
consequences for teacher practice are comparatively low-key and can vary consid-
erably across schools and municipalities. In contrast, Singapore’s EPMS structures 
for teacher accountability are highly centralised and influential. The pervasiveness 
of this performance management system is evident in the fact that every sin-
gle Singaporean interview participant, when asked about teacher accountability 
instruments, mentioned EPMS key results areas, performance reporting forms, 
thrice-yearly work review sessions, performance grades and promotions.
Different teacher accountability approaches, 
comparable efficacy?
Given these stark differences between Finland’s and Singapore’s approaches to 
teacher accountability, how can we understand the high quality of teaching in 
both of these countries? One way to interpret this is that teacher accountability 
TABLE 11.1 Summary of teacher accountability instruments in Finland and Singapore
Finland Singapore
Setting standards National curriculum; strong 
standards at the point of entry 
to the teaching profession
Extensive teacher performance 




discussions with the principal 
in most schools
Annual lesson observations; thrice-
yearly performance management 




Small salary supplements for 
additional responsibilities; firing 
for egregious behaviour
Performance-based annual bonuses 
and career progression
Contrasting approaches, comparable efficacy? 233
instruments are irrelevant to the quality of teachers’ work and do not make any 
positive contribution to teacher practice. A second interpretation is that teacher 
accountability instruments can, in fact, contribute to teacher practice: disparate 
approaches to teacher accountability can be equally effective, as long as the instru-
ments are well designed. A third possible interpretation agrees with the second in 
arguing that accountability instruments do affect teachers’ work, but diverges from 
the second in further asserting accountability instruments have different effects 
depending on how well they fit the larger contexts in which they are embedded.
Based on the interviews I conducted as well as secondary sources, I believe that 
the third interpretation is the most plausible. Teacher accountability instruments 
can, indeed, influence teacher practice constructively – but only if the instru-
ments are compatible with the macro and exo-contexts in which they are imple-
mented. To give some suggestive evidence, Figure 11.1 summarises interview 
participants’ responses when I asked them what would happen, hypothetically, 
if their country adopted the other country’s approach to teacher accountability 
(i.e. if Finland introduced EPMS structures, or if Singapore removed the career 
ladder, formal teacher appraisal and performance bonuses). Note that I asked this 
question in an open-ended manner, so the statements in Figure 11.1 represent my 
summaries of participants’ responses, rather than a set of statements presented to 
participants for their agreement or disagreement.
Regardless of their personal preferences, none of the participants believed 
that the other country’s teacher accountability approach would definitely be 
preferred by most teachers and/or would improve education in their country. 
Several Singaporean participants said that they would personally prefer the 
non-competitive autonomy of Finland’s approach – but even these participants 
doubted that it would work at the system level, because they anticipated that 
some teachers would dislike the relative lack of structure and the absence of 
performance-based reward. For example, Singaporean participant Maggie said 
that the Finnish approach would give her the flexibility to develop her teaching 
practice long term rather than focusing on short-term performance targets, but 
added that:
FIGURE 11.1 An summary of interview participants’ answers when asked what would 
happen if, hypothetically, their country adopted the other country’s teacher account-
ability instruments
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I think if you suddenly changed the system, most of the teachers will be very 
stressed because they have no idea what is being observed. Singaporeans 
find comfort, I think, in knowing exactly what is expected, and they like 
to do it to the letter.
Similarly, Finnish participant Juhani appreciated that Singapore’s EPMS 
recognises good work and gives teachers a structured way of identifying their 
strengths and weaknesses but said that:
We are so independent here. And we like that independence in our class-
rooms so much, that even that bonus would not make this system a good 
thing. […] And we are so equal, among teachers. […] We do not want to 
give others the possibility of rushing higher. […] We have done some stud-
ies about rewarding people with money, and it gives satisfaction for shorter 
period of time than when you are valued by the society you work in.
Given these responses, it seems unlikely that teacher accountability instru-
ments have no influence on teachers’ work, as in the first possible interpretation. 
And given how strongly participants reacted against the other country’s account-
ability approach (e.g. Masa, describing Finnish teachers: ‘They would quit. They 
would go on strike’; Sonia: ‘The average Singaporean teacher will probably be 
up in arms’), it seems unlikely that any well-aligned set of accountability instru-
ments could be equally effective in any given setting, as in the second possible 
interpretation. Internal coherence within a set of teacher accountability instru-
ments may be necessary for efficacy, but it is not sufficient.4 Instead, as in the 
third interpretation, teacher accountability instruments need to be compatible 
with their respective macrosystems in order to be effective.
Teacher motivation as the key to teacher accountability
The key to making sense of Finland’s and Singapore’s disparate but comparably 
effective approaches to teacher accountability lies in (1) the relationship between 
accountability and motivation, and (2) the relationship between motivation and 
context. First, motivation – defined by Schunk et al. (2010, p. 4) as ‘the process 
whereby goal-directed activity is instigated and sustained’ – is closely connected 
to accountability. Whether implicitly or explicitly, accountability instruments 
targeting teacher practice assume that student outcomes can improve when teach-
ers work harder, i.e. with raised motivation, and/or work differently, i.e. with 
motivation redirected towards different goals (see also Kozlowski and Lauen, 
2019). Thus, teacher motivation is the linchpin of accountability instruments that 
successfully change teacher practice.
All three accountability mechanisms discussed in the previous section – setting 
standards, communicating information and allocating consequences – can influ-
ence teacher motivation, although they do so in different ways. For example, 
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informational instruments influence teachers’ motivation via their desire to be 
regarded favourably when information about their practice is compared to stake-
holder expectations. When asked how accountability instruments affected his 
work, Timothy, a Singaporean interview participant, responded:
It’s always at the back of one’s mind. […] Yeah, because you know that 
there are other people who are watching you, so to speak. […] I would 
consider it a negative motivation, or not the most desired form of motiva-
tion. But at least it helps to spur you on when you are drained.
Informational instruments can vary greatly. There are many differences 
between, for example, a mandatory questionnaire on classroom activities and a 
self-initiated troubleshooting session with colleagues. Despite these differences, 
any information-based accountability instrument that successfully shapes teacher 
motivation does so by prompting teachers’ desires to compare favourably to a set 
of expectations, whether codified or tacit, shared or unilateral, precise or vague, 
externally imposed or personally espoused.
These expectations may come from accountability instruments that set stand-
ards for teacher practice. Unlike the informational mechanism, which operates 
through teachers’ awareness that they are being actively compared to a set of 
expectations, the standard-setting mechanism passively directs teacher moti-
vation towards such expectations. Passivity notwithstanding, standards can be 
highly influential. For example, Satu said the following about Finland’s national 
curriculum:
I have the basic rules there. So it’s easier than thinking, ‘Whoa, what I will 
do now?’ The year is not empty. […] And it’s easier for the teacher to follow 
the curriculum than invent something by themselves.
As with informational instruments, standards can take on a variety of tones 
in a range of relational settings. Standards can safeguard community networks 
through shared norms, or channel competition towards remunerative targets.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, some accountability instruments allo-
cate consequences based on stakeholders’ judgements of teacher practice – thus 
influencing teacher motivation via the desire to gain rewards and avoid penalties. 
When asked about the consequences of teacher performance grades, Geok Ling, 
a Singaporean teacher in middle management, said:
You know that, ‘Okay, they’re going to grade me like this, and this is 
how I can get more because of the bonus.’ So people will drive their 
behaviour towards the criteria. […] But you can argue that it’s a neces-
sary devil; it’s a double-edged sword. While it may raise the standard 
and it motivates some, because they see it as an affirmation, it will also 
demoralise some.
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As Geok Ling observes, teachers’ perspectives on accountability instruments 
can be heterogeneous, yielding heterogeneous effects on motivation.
To illustrate the degree to which accountability instruments may potentially 
change teacher motivation, consider interview participant Masa’s description 
of Finland’s new Kilpailukykysopimus (KIKY, i.e. competitiveness pact) policy. 
KIKY stipulates, among other things, that all full-time employees nationwide 
work an extra 24 hours annually without extra pay (SAK, 2016). This emphasis 
on regulating work hours is a clear departure from Finland’s established approach 
to teacher accountability, in which careful selection processes and pre-service 
training construct a competent and motivated body of teachers who experi-
ence relatively few external controls over their day-to-day work. In Masa’s view, 
the mismatch between KIKY stipulations and this established approach was 
damaging:
Teachers started complaining about being a teacher, which was new, for 
me. People were starting to think about changing jobs. Because all of a sud-
den, we’ve got this bureaucracy that’s keeping track of this time. They’re 
realising that we already do more than that anyway. And […] now they’re 
doing it for the time, which equates to money, rather than because some-
thing inside says, ‘This is what needs to be done.’ So the teachers’ personal 
standards have dropped.
Although the new cross-sector KIKY policy may have eroded some intrinsic 
motivation, most Finnish interview participants emphasised the long-established 
internal standards that Masa also mentioned. They agreed that most Finnish 
teachers are highly motivated to teach well, despite the negligible rewards and 
penalties.
How the macrosystem shapes teacher motivation 
and teacher accountability
So, what matters in teacher accountability is not whether the accountability 
instruments are extensive (as in Singapore) or less extensive (as in Finland). 
Rather, what matters is that the instruments influence teacher motivation in 
ways that lead to desirable student outcomes. Like other professionals who serve 
multiple goals that are difficult to monitor and measure, teachers constantly and 
actively redistribute limited resources between numerous priorities (Lipsky, 
2010; Murnane and Cohen, 1986). And they do not respond mechanistically to 
accountability instruments. Satu, who was quoted earlier speaking favourably 
about Finland’s national curriculum, also said that:
Even if they make quite a big change to the curriculum, some teachers […] 
may say, ‘Huh, pfft. Waste of time. I’ll do what I have done for the past 
thirty-five years.’
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Similarly, Maggie, a teacher from Singapore, observed that:
Let’s say you have a top-down policy implementation. If you didn’t trust 
[the teachers] with the discussion beforehand, then when you do imple-
ment it, they would just do whatever it takes to survive, and it might not 
turn out the way you want it. Like, they will modify it, just to placate you 
and show you some semblance of what you want to see.
Satu’s and Maggie’s remarks illustrate an argument advanced by Andrews 
et al. (2017, pp. 113–118) that effective public service delivery relies not only on 
the administrative apparatus of accountability but also on the alignment between 
each actor’s duties and their sense of personal and social responsibility (see also 
McLaughlin, 1987).
Simply put, an accountability instrument will only influence a teacher’s moti-
vation positively if the teacher regards the instrument as sufficiently meaningful, 
legitimate or otherwise persuasive (Verger and Parcerisa, 2017). In their review 
of psychological research on how accountability affects social choices, Lerner 
and Tetlock (1999) found that accountability only leads to beneficial increases 
in cognitive effort when numerous contingent factors coincide. One such factor 
was whether the accountability instrument was seen as legitimate. Similarly, in 
an analysis of an accountability policy change in a US state, Kim et al. (2019) 
matched data from teacher self-report questionnaires with principal-reported 
evaluation ratings and found that teachers who viewed the new evaluation poli-
cies as legitimate were more likely to improve their instructional practice.
There is a close connection here between legitimacy and trust. As noted in 
Chapter 1 of this volume, trust depends on the perception that the recipient of 
the trust is competent, benevolent and has integrity. These three traits clearly 
(though not completely) overlap with the three traits that Kim et al. (2019) iden-
tify as key ingredients in regarding a policy as legitimate: whether its instruments 
are valid and reliable, which overlaps with competence; whether it is procedur-
ally fair, which overlaps with integrity; and whether its intended outcomes are 
worthwhile, which is somewhat analogous to benevolence (see also Tyler, 2006). 
Hence, if a teacher believes that the design and intent of a teacher accountability 
instrument do reflect these traits, they are more likely to regard the instrument 
as legitimate.
However, as noted earlier, teachers face competing priorities in their daily 
work, and even a legitimate accountability instrument may not influence teacher 
motivation if it is superseded by other priorities, as in Satu’s observations on how 
some Finnish teachers’ respond to curricular change. Conversely, even if a teacher 
does not regard an instrument as trustworthy, it may still influence their moti-
vation, as with Finland’s KIKY stipulation that Masa described. Furthermore, as 
Singaporean participant Geok Ling observed, a legitimate accountability instru-
ment can have heterogeneous effects, raising the motivation of some teachers 
while demotivating others.
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Heterogeneity notwithstanding, there will be some broad patterns in the 
accountability instruments that most teachers within a given setting regard as 
compelling. This is because teachers’ perspectives and, in turn, the overall effi-
cacy of teacher accountability instruments are shaped by context. As Pawson and 
Tilley (1997, p. 216) observe in their seminal work on realist policy evaluation, 
‘subjects will only act upon the resources and choices offered by a program if 
they are in conducive settings’. Similarly, Bronfenbrenner (1977, p. 515) observes 
that macrosystems ‘set the pattern for the structures and activities occurring at 
the concrete level’. These macrosystems comprise societal ‘blueprints’, or ‘the 
overarching institutional patterns of the culture or subculture’ (Bronfenbrenner, 
1977). Hence, the interview participants’ vehement reactions against the other 
country’s accountability approach: Finland’s macrosystem is not a conducive set-
ting for Singapore’s EPMS, nor is Singapore’s macrosystem a conducive setting 
for Finland’s light-touch approach.
Compatibility between teacher accountability instruments 
and macro-level trust
How does this play out in Finland and Singapore? First, as shown earlier, each 
country’s set of teacher accountability instruments is well designed, with com-
patibility between the instruments such that they collectively influence teacher 
motivation in desirable ways. Finland’s teacher accountability instruments 
establish and orient high levels of teacher motivation at the point of entry into 
the teaching profession, while Singapore manages and motivates teachers’ work 
throughout their careers through a system of interlocking standards, monitoring 
structures and performance-based consequences. But internal compatibility is 
not enough. Another factor in their successful approaches to teacher accounta-
bility is compatibility between their accountability instruments and the wider 
macrosystem. In the absence of such external compatibility, the accountability 
instruments would fail to influence teacher motivation as intended by policy-
makers, instead of having negative or null effects – as with Finland’s KIKY 
regulations that may have compromised teachers’ intrinsic motivation.
Teacher accountability is influenced by numerous interacting macrosys-
temic patterns. I focus here on one such pattern: the distribution of public 
trust in the education system.5 Whereas the absence of external compatibility 
between teacher accountability instruments and the macrosystem can yield 
negative or null effects, the presence of such external compatibility may result 
in a positive feedback loop. If the choice of teacher accountability instruments 
is aligned with the distribution of trust, this trust will legitimate the instru-
ments, thus increasing their likelihood of raising or positively redirecting 
teacher motivation. These positive motivational changes may then improve 
classroom practice and student outcomes, which, in turn, will shore up trust in 
the education system.
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Finns and Singaporeans both place great trust in their education systems, but 
the distribution of this trust differs. In Finland, the trust is spread throughout 
every level of the education system, such that a great deal of trust is invested 
in teachers as highly trained and motivated professionals. In Singapore, how-
ever, the main locus of trust is the Ministry of Education and its capacity to 
coordinate and incentivise desirable activities throughout the education system. 
Accordingly, Finland’s teacher accountability instruments aim to mobilise 
and empower teachers to work towards desirable student outcomes, whereas 
Singapore’s teacher accountability instruments pursue the same aim by endowing 
the government with extensive capacities for shaping teachers’ work. Following 
Cerna’s (2014) terminology, the dominant form of trust in Singapore’s education 
system is institutional trust in the Ministry of Education. In Finland, institu-
tional trust in the government is certainly present, but it does not supersede what 
Cerna calls generalised trust in teachers.
Finland: Generalised trust in teachers alongside 
standard-setting accountability instruments
The generalised trust that Finnish teachers enjoy is a form of interpersonal trust. 
However, while particularised interpersonal trust in a particular teacher is based 
on first-hand interactions, generalised trust is instead based on a widely shared 
confidence in teachers’ collective professional integrity. In Hannele’s words:
I think Finnish people rely on the teachers. I hear people say all the time 
that, ‘I know you have a good school. I know you have good teachers.’ […] 
They trust that we do our job.
This trust in teachers does not imply a lack of trust in other levels of the edu-
cation system, but rather that teachers are trusted to have command over their 
own work. According to Helena:
It goes through the hierarchy. The Ministry of Education trusts the 
[National Agency for Education] to develop the curriculum based on 
certain things they’ve laid out. […] And then they trust the municipali-
ties to come up with the local curricula. And those municipalities trust 
the schools to come up with school-based curricula. And then the school 
administration trusts that the teachers will do something useful with the 
school curricula in the way that they deem best, using the books, materials, 
and methods they find best. And then I, as a teacher, trust that when I tell 
my students to do something, they will do it.
Thus, actors at each level of educational delivery are trusted to do what is 
expected in their respective spheres.
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In the sphere of the classroom, both the general public and the government 
trust that teachers will do their best. Consequently, this generalised trust in 
Finland’s selected and highly trained teachers legitimates the relative lack of 
formal teacher accountability. In Antero’s words:
When they selected me to study teaching, of course they checked that my 
personality and who I am fits the job. And after that, I have been on my 
own. Nobody has come here to say that, ‘You must change. And you must 
do it like this, not like that.’ I am in charge here.
Concurrently, the successful track record of this approach reinforces public 
trust in teachers. According to Liisa:
There haven’t been any discussions about Finland adopting any teacher 
accountability instruments from other countries. I think there’s a consensus 
that the thing runs well now, so there are no very big problems about teach-
ers not doing what they’re supposed to do. […] We know what we need to 
do. So we don’t need an extra system to tell us what to do in that way.
Hence, the highly motivated and trained people who succeed in entering 
the teaching profession enjoy a virtuous cycle of autonomy and public trust 
(see also Aho et al., 2006; Crehan, 2016a; Simola et al., 2017). As early as 
1981, a Finnish government official spoke to an OECD delegation about ‘the 
importance of traditional freedom for teachers in Finland’ to choose their 
teaching methods, textbooks and curricular emphases (OECD, 1982). Despite 
this longstanding autonomy, Finnish teachers have not always been so highly 
esteemed. Simola (2014) observes that, prior to the 2000s, most Finns regarded 
the school system as good, though not exceptional, but some influential busi-
ness leaders were criticising the system vociferously and advocating for more 
educational competition – until the 2001 release of PISA results silenced them. 
Thus, PISA league tables inadvertently served as an accountability instrument, 
conveying the information that Finland’s teachers were collectively doing a 
good job, thus easing the national-level pressure to apply more accountability 
instruments to teachers.
Beyond education, an oft-cited indicator of generalised trust is the propor-
tion of people answering affirmatively when asked whether ‘most people can be 
trusted’ or ‘you need to be very careful in dealing with people’. In the European 
Values Study (EVS) 2008, Finland had the fourth highest proportion of respond-
ents favouring generalised trust, only exceeded by Nordic neighbours Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden (EVS, 2016). While Finland and its Nordic counterparts 
did not participate in the more recent World Values Survey (WVS) 2010–2014, 
which included the same questionnaire item, only the Netherlands exceeded the 
proportion of Finnish EVS 2008 respondents favouring trust, and marginally so 
(WVS Association, 2015).
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This balanced distribution of trust works in tandem with another important 
macro-level value: a societal emphasis on egalitarianism. Both of these values 
are evident in Helena’s account of how some foreign exchange students at their 
school reacted to school cafeteria food that seemed tasteless to them:
Their solution to it was very simple: ‘Why don’t you just tell the kitchen 
to make spicier food?’ Which makes sense from the point of view of, ‘The 
kitchen staff’s job is to serve me food,’ and, ‘They’re lower in the hierar-
chy.’ But from our point of view, the kitchen is run by a company, which 
we buy the service of. And they’re just people working in the kitchen. And 
they don’t come and tell me how to teach maths, so I wouldn’t feel like it 
was my job to tell them how to make food.
Finland’s egalitarianism is evident in, among other things, its relative eco-
nomic equality. During the 10 most recent years for which Gini data are available 
(2005–2015), Finland consistently had 1 of the 10 most equal income distri-
butions in the world (World Bank, 2019). Finland also had the third highest 
score in Oxfam’s 2018 Commitment to Reducing Inequality index (Lawson and 
Martin, 2018).
Singapore: Institutional trust in the education ministry 
and extensive instruments for teacher accountability
On the other hand, Singapore had the eighth lowest score in the same 
Commitment to Reducing Inequality index (Lawson and Martin, 2018). One 
interview participant, Jeffrey, suggested that Singapore’s tightly packed urban 
geography facilitates ubiquitous stratification:
You’re kind of fenced in. […] So that very much forces you higher up on the 
value chain. You basically can’t choose to slack off. […] . I mean, you can 
say publish or perish—but you don’t even have the option (laughter) in the 
education system. It’s pass or distinction. That’s it. (laughing) Because no 
matter how badly you do, they’re going to put you somewhere, whether it’s 
ITE [i.e. Institute of Technical Education], Normal (Tech), or Foundation. 
There’s somewhere that they have specially designated for you.
Jeffrey’s remarks imply not only socioeconomic stratification (with a ‘value 
chain’ and a ladder of educational prestige), but also political hierarchy (with 
constraints on individual agency, since you are ‘fenced in’ and ‘they’, i.e. the 
government, designate your place in society). The combination of hierarchical 
governance alongside educational and socioeconomic stratification pervades the 
public sphere in Singapore, having been fostered by the government under the 
banner of competitive, progress-oriented meritocracy throughout the second 
half of the 20th century (Lee, 2000; Tan, 2018; see also Teo, 2018; Tremewan, 
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1994). Some interview participants expressed discomfort with this emphasis on 
achievement, meritocracy and competition – whether in the EPMS rewards sys-
tem or in Singapore’s macrosystem more broadly – but they also assumed that it 
was ingrained in both local culture and national governance and was unlikely 
to change.
One element of Singapore’s sociopolitical stratification is a hierarchical dis-
tribution of trust and authority in the education system. In Singapore, public 
trust in the education system is not distributed throughout the system, as in 
Finland. Instead, it is concentrated on the government. In the WVS 2010–2014, 
Singapore had the fourth highest proportion of respondents – after China, Qatar 
and Azerbaijan – reporting that they had ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confi-
dence in their central government (WVS Association, 2015).
When I asked interview participants whether their lived experience supported 
the WVS finding that most Singaporeans were highly confident in public institu-
tions, every participant agreed. (However, some added that younger generations 
have started to question the government.) The precedence of trust in govern-
ment over trust in teachers was also evident in some participants’ responses to 
the hypothetical question about Finland’s teacher accountability approach. For 
example, Eleanor said that:
My immediate response is, it’s not going to work. […] It will be very 
teacher-dependent, and so it will be the luck of the draw if your child gets 
into this classroom where this teacher is a bit more progressive or has more 
initiative, then you benefit. Whereas in other classrooms where the teacher 
is just happy with what she or he is doing, then the child is not going to 
learn as much. So that inconsistency is something the government will not 
want to risk, because the feedback from the people will be quite strong. I 
think there is a great sense of entitlement here, where the people depend a 
lot on the government to get things done.
Andy’s response shows a similar dynamic. Andy described himself as a ‘happy 
ordinary teacher’, a moniker adopted by some Singaporean teachers who prior-
itise classroom teaching over climbing the career ladder towards the ministry 
headquarters. After I told him about Finland’s teacher accountability approach, 
Andy commented that those who would enter teaching under Finland’s approach 
were likely to be happy ordinary teachers,6 and then said:
So if Singapore were to embark on such a system, it’s possible that it might 
be better in terms of attracting the right kind of people. But yeah, where 
would we train all our bureaucrats? They need to experience life on the 
ground as well.
This consciousness of system-level needs over teachers’ needs was a recurring 
theme in the Singapore interviews.
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Even though Singapore’s distribution of trust differs from Finland’s, its 
teacher accountability instruments are likewise matched to its respective 
distribution. This yields the same mutual reinforcement: the locus of trust 
legitimates the chosen instruments, and the efficacy of the instruments 
strengthens public trust. Specifically, high public trust in Singapore’s govern-
ment legitimates its considerable control over teachers’ work. The strength of 
this trust is such that teachers generally accede to the extensive accountability 
instruments, despite any personal qualms they may have (see also Ee, 2018). 
For example, Timothy said:
To use a very civil service phrase, these [EPMS] expectations are all cas-
caded down from your ministers and the top policymakers. So what they 
would have in mind, I believe, is in line with what, hopefully, will help 
make the country a better one.
This affirmation of government authority is especially striking given, less 
than a minute earlier, Timothy had said that he had ‘many reservations’ about 
how the EPMS was carried out. Several participants displayed a similar sense of 
internal tension when they disagreed with government stances. However, others 
appeared very comfortable with the hierarchical authority. Furthermore, as Jane 
suggests, even those who feel internal discomfort may outwardly comply because 
of the government’s success in educational and economic development:
They have confidence [in government institutions] because, all the while, 
the country has been doing well. But I think, slowly, some of the younger 
ones are questioning, and some of the older ones want to have some oppo-
sition [to the government]. But they don’t want to rock the boat, because 
they’re still very happy.
Since the government’s extensive control over education and other aspects of 
public life has proved effective, most Singaporeans continue to trust government 
institutions. For now, at least, trust in the Singaporean government supports – 
and is supported by – its extensive teacher accountability instruments, whereas 
public trust in teachers justifies the Finnish government’s relatively sparse teacher 
accountability instruments, and the sustained efficacy of these instruments shores 
up trust in teachers.7
Conclusion
To summarise, Singapore’s education ministry sets extensive standards for multi-
ple areas of teacher practice, and the information collected on these areas informs 
market-oriented governance of the school system. However, departing from lib-
ertarian conventions, teachers and schools are not independent suppliers in a mar-
ketplace in which families seek their best options for educational consumption. 
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(In fact, the scope of Singapore’s educational market is constrained by the stipu-
lation that Singaporean citizens who seek to enrol in private schools require indi-
vidual authorisation from the ministry [Singapore Ministry of Education, 2018].) 
Rather, teachers are dependent on the ministry as the sole buyer of their services. 
Instead of competing for higher enrolments in their schools, teachers compete for 
larger bonuses and career development opportunities, which are overseen by the 
ministry. Yet this top-heavy approach to teacher accountability works because 
of public confidence in the government, alongside established macrosystemic 
emphases on hierarchy and competition.
In contrast, Finland’s government sets strong standards for teacher practice 
at the point of entry to the teaching profession, but this exercise of hierarchy 
serves to enable and safeguard subsequent teacher autonomy. Autonomy not-
withstanding, teachers in Finland do not conform to an idealised template of 
network governance. While teachers, school leaders, municipalities and nation-
al-level education authorities do work towards common goals as interdependent 
actors, the dominant logic is not collaborative decision-making, but rather indi-
vidual responsibility within clearly demarcated domains. Hence, the degree of 
professional collaboration among teachers may vary from extensive to virtually 
non-existent. But, for the most part, teachers share a strong work ethic and a 
commitment to the egalitarian aims of the national curriculum. Thus, hierarchi-
cal standard-setting in Finland facilitates loose networks of autonomous teachers, 
whereas standard-setting in Singapore facilitates centralised quality improve-
ment via professional competition for bonuses, promotions and prestige.
Differences notwithstanding, these successful approaches to teacher account-
ability share an underlying principle: compatibility between teacher accounta-
bility instruments and the macrosystem. Each education system gives the final 
say in teacher practice to the stakeholders that are most trusted with classroom 
matters, whether Finland’s highly trained teachers or Singapore’s highly mobi-
lised education ministry. This compatibility helps to legitimise these instru-
ments in teachers’ eyes, which facilitates the influence of the accountability 
instruments over teacher motivation and teacher practice. In turn, the efficacy 
of the accountability instruments in facilitating desirable educational outcomes 
also legitimises public trust in Finland’s teachers and Singapore’s education 
ministry. As observed in Chapter 1, the trust often has a reciprocal nature, 
which can deepen over time.
In aiming for brevity, this discussion has veered into some generalisations. 
Finland’s education system may be premised on egalitarianism, but this does 
not obliterate the influence of family socioeconomic background on educational 
pathways. In Helena’s words: ‘We have research information that students whose 
parents have academic [rather than vocational] schooling do better academically. 
[…] So it would be lying to say that doesn’t exist’. Also, despite stratification in 
Singapore, the school system offers a high baseline of education even for the 
less privileged, given that the lowest socioeconomic quartile of Singaporean 
15-year-olds outperformed the average OECD 15-year-old in PISA 2015 
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science (OECD, 2016). Moreover, Finland and Singapore may differ greatly, but 
they are far from being binary opposites. For one thing, both countries share 
a society-wide affirmation of the value of education, as observed by interview 
participant Mark. Additionally, interview participants in both the countries 
expressed a strong sense of intrinsic motivation to teach well, despite the vast 
differences in the extrinsic incentive structures that circumscribe their work.
Still, the dominant macrosystemic patterns discussed here – about egalitar-
ianism, stratification, autonomy and structure – need to be taken seriously in 
designing teacher accountability policy: for example, a teacher who grew up in 
an egalitarian education system may treat a norm-referenced performance bonus 
very differently from a colleague who was educated in a highly competitive and 
stratified system. Equally, a teacher who had been socialised to prize their profes-
sional autonomy might resent the introduction of detailed guidelines outlining 
their duties, whereas a teacher accustomed to relying on such guidelines might 
flounder if they were removed.
In this chapter, I have mapped one pathway through which the cultural 
macrosystem can have a pivotal influence on individual teacher’s responses 
to exosystem-level policy. However, I am not suggesting that macrosystemic 
constraints necessarily limit any given education system to a single, cultur-
ally dictated model of teacher accountability. Neither I am suggesting that 
macro-level cultural patterns are the sole – or even the prime – influence on 
how teachers respond to accountability instruments. Social and professional 
behaviour is informed by numerous inputs. Even if certain sociocultural pat-
terns are dominant and widely acknowledged in a given macrosystem, these 
patterns will not be universally shared (Maxwell, 2012).8 What I am arguing, 
in line with the other chapters in this volume, is that teacher accountability 
takes place in an ecosystem, in which different levels of the system can influence 
each other multidirectionally. While the cases of Finland and Singapore show 
how the macrosystem can offer orientations for effective teacher accountability 
policy, it is equally possible that teacher accountability instruments can shape 
teachers’ macrosystemically situated conceptions of their work (especially when 
accountability structures are closely aligned with initial teacher training and 
other aspects of teachers’ socialisation, as in Holloway, 2018; Holloway and 
Brass, 2018). When discussing and designing teacher accountability policy, the 
macrosystem and its distribution of trust matters – but so do other components 
of the system.
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 1 Following Bovens’ (2007, p. 450) definition of accountability as ‘a relationship between 
an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or 
her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences’, I formally define teacher accountability instruments as tools, practices, 
and structures that aim to orient teacher practice toward stakeholder expectations by 
(a) collecting information about teachers’ individual or collective practice and commu-
nicating this information to stakeholders, (b) setting standards by which stakeholders 
judge teacher practice, and/or (c) allocating consequences based on stakeholders’ judge-
ments of teachers’ practice.
 2 I am grateful to Lucy Crehan for the observation that teacher accountability systems can 
concentrate their quality controls on different junctures, whether the inputs, processes or 
outputs of the teaching profession. Similarly, Oates (2015, p. 4) observes that the teaching 
profession in Finland emphasises ‘front-end restrictions’ rather than ‘back-end’ ones.
 3 For comparison, in a 2017 survey, 65% of Finnish teachers said they had had one devel-
opmental discussion during the prior 12 months, 27% said they had had two or more 
discussions, while 8% said they had not had any (OAJ, 2018, p. 31).
 4 Interview participants’ generally positive views about their country’s respective 
approaches to teacher accountability do not mean that they were uncritical. In fact, 
some participants from both countries emphasised that they knew of colleagues 
who were not especially motivated to teach well, but nonetheless were allowed to 
remain in the profession. In Finland, this was partly because many teachers hold ten-
ured positions (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2018a). In Singapore, this 
room for ‘cruising’, as some participants called it, could emerge from teachers’ seniority, 
or from favourably misrepresenting one’s work to the reporting officer (e.g. showcasing 
recommended pedagogical strategies only during scheduled lesson observations), or 
from what one participant called the ‘very merciful’ lower tiers of the grading system 
(although other participants disputed these mercies). Besides this room for slack perfor-
mance, other criticisms raised by multiple participants included the lack of professional 
feedback on classroom practice in Finland, and the competitiveness, stress, and potential 
harm to teachers’ self-esteem in Singapore. Notwithstanding such shortcomings, the 
overall picture painted by interview participants was of effective teacher accountability 
instruments within effective school systems.
 5 When conducting these interviews, I was not specifically investigating the distribution of 
public trust in the education system. I did ask interview participants about some aspects 
of social capital (including generalised trust) and about how hierarchical/accountability 
egalitarian their countries were, due to pre-existing studies indicating that these socio-
cultural constructs may affect the influence of instruments (on social capital, see Iyengar, 
2012; Webber, 2010; on hierarchy, see Broekman, 2016; Gelfand et al., 2004; Velayutham 
and Perera, 2004). However, I only posed these questions about social capital and hier-
archy at the end of each interview, after asking more general questions about aspects of 
sociocultural context that influence education in their country, and that influence teach-
ers’ responses to accountability instruments. The centrality of the distribution of trust in 
the education system emerged from participants’ responses to these questions, as well as 
other parts of the interviews.
 6 Besides Andy, a few other participants noted that changing the teacher accountability 
approach would also change the type of person who became a teacher, implying that 
a self-selection effect might influence the efficacy of teacher accountability. Even so, 
such self-selection would not be sufficient for effective teacher accountability if the 
accountability instruments were at odds with the macrosystem. As noted above, sev-
eral Singaporean participants said that, on a personal level, they would strongly prefer 
Finland’s teacher accountability approach over Singapore’s. Yet they persist in Singapore’s 
teaching profession despite their aversion to its accountability approach, thus showing 
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that the self-selection mechanism is not all-encompassing – unlike the macrosystem, 
which influences every teachers’ response to accountability instruments, albeit to differ-
ent degrees.
 7 Besides macrosystemic trust, there are other identifiable aspects of Finland’s and 
Singapore’s sociocultural contexts that have a mutually reinforcing interaction with 
each country’s approach to teacher accountability. As I argue elsewhere, Finnish and 
Singaporean interview participants had distinctly different mental models of the factors 
that raised and lowered their motivation, and their respective mental models were com-
patible with each education system’s respective accountability approach (Hwa, 2019).
 8 Moreover, I suspect that Finland and Singapore may both benefit from relatively strong 
societal consensus about certain values and priorities – perhaps resulting from small 
populations and relative institutional stability, among other factors. If my hunch is true, 
such sociocultural alignment may offer clearer orientations for context-sensitive policy-
making than would be present in many other education systems.
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